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THE NEW TREATY MAKERS 
JosE E. ALvAREz* 
Abstract: The "erosion of sovereignty" that is said to characterize 
globalization is not generally associated with any deviation from the 
fundamental principle that states must freely consent before they can be 
said to be bound by any international agreement. With few exceptions, 
as with respect to Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, states are rarely told 
that they must adhere to any particular treaty-despite emerging notions 
of "global governance." The initiation and conclusion of modern 
treaties is still generally seen as the affirmation of sovereignty, rather 
than its diminution. Modern treaties, the only source of international 
obligation said to emerge from conscious attempts to make law and still 
requiring the unambiguous, genuine consent of states, remain the 
embodiment of sovereignty as classically understood. This Article 
challenges this view by examining how international organizations have 
altered the methods by which treaty negotiations are initiated as well as 
the final results achieved through such negotiations. If state sovereignty 
has been "eroded" or transformed in the wake of World War II, the new 
forms of treaty making and the new treaty makers are part of that story. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cynthia Lichtenstein, as a scholar and teacher, is that rarity in 
public international law: a gifted generalist who has been equally 
adept in discussing human rights as trade; international monetary 
affairs as international courts. Her passion for addressing the "big pic-
ture"-the relative power of sovereign states and international organi-
zations, the relative weight of law and politics-is reflected in the cho-
sen theme for this Symposium: "Globalization and the Erosion of 
Sovereignty." Professor Lichtenstein's scholarship, which has often 
crossed discrete specializations within our field to consider, for exam-
ple, issues of war and peace, as well as international economic law, 
now appears prescient, and not merely since September 11, 2001. 
It is now clear that, as Professor Lichtenstein has often reminded 
us, there are few truly "self-contained regimes" in international law, 
* Professor, Columbia Law School. Presented as a keynote address in a Symposium at 
Boston College Law School on Nov. 2, 2001 given in honor of Professor Cynthia Lichten-
stein. 
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no clear lines separating economic concerns from those of national 
security, no clean boundaries between institutions of international 
governance or between those organizations and domestic law making 
mechanisms. We are becoming increasingly aware that the lines be-
tween domestic and international rule making are as porous as the 
borders between nations. This is a world that has the Security Council 
(most recently in resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001 barring and 
freezing financial transactions of undefined terrorists) assuming roles 
once reserved to the U.S. Treasury Department under the Interna-
tional Emergency Powers Act. The Council's authority to secure or 
maintain international peace has been used as a license to use force 
against unelected regimes, to put pressure on war lords who deny 
food to people, to oversee mechanisms for compensating victims of 
aggression as in Kuwait, to establish war crimes tribunals, and to 
authorize collective military action against human rights violators. 
Other international organizations have also expanded their institu-
tional boundaries. For its part, the World Bank (Bank) now embraces 
goals such as environmental sustainability, anti-corruption, tax re-
form, and privatization. The Bank worries about indices of success far 
removed from the quality of the infrastructure projects that it was 
originally charged with establishing-such as levels of infant mortality, 
gender equality, and equitable income distribution. That financial 
institution, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Health Organization (WHO), is even now collaborating on 
a treaty to regulate the sale and marketing of tobacco products. 
In addition, the 'judicial branch" of globalization is becoming 
restive as well. The members of the international judiciary, now 200 
members strong across some seventeen international tribunals, are 
also increasingly adept at crossing disciplinary divides to pass on the 
consistency of domestic law with international rules.l Globalization 
means that NAFTA arbitral panels, under Chapter 11, are beginning 
to issue decisions on regulatory takings that some liken to those of the 
U.S. Supreme Court during the Lochner era.2 Dispute settlers 
charged with interpreting trade rules are now passing judgment on 
the customary law status of the precautionary principle as well as do-
1 See, e.g., Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International judicial Bodies: The Pieces 
of the PuzzlR, 31 N.YU.J. INT'LL. & POL. 709, 711 (1999). 
2 See VICKI BEEN, THE GLOBAL FIFTH AMENDMENT: NAFTA's INVESTMENT PROTEC-
TIONS AND THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 'REGULATORY TAKINGS' Doc-
TRINE (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author). 
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mestic environmental regulations.3 Even relatively weak adjudicators, 
such as the Human Rights Committee, charged with interpreting the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are 
bold enough to suggest that the right to life in that treaty casts doubt 
on the legality of designing, testing, manufacturing, possessing, and 
deploying nuclear weapons.4 Not to be left behind, a number of na-
tional courts, such as the House of Lords in the case involving Pino-
chet and the Second Circuit in the case against Karadzic, are increas-
ingly engaging in transjudicial communication of their own-with 
judges of other nations-while challenging formerly sacrosanct con-
cepts of international law such as head of state immunity or the liabil-
ity of non-state actors for international torts. 5 
These incremental expansions of the authority of international 
regimes, along with the increased internationalization of domestic law 
making and judicial processes, and the domestication of international 
rules and processes, are the types of phenomena that the organizers 
intend to capture by pairing the twin concepts of "globalization" and 
"eroding sovereignty" as the theme of this Symposium. 
Both "globalization" and "sovereignty" are, of course, contested 
terms. For believers in threatening U.N. black helicopters, the erosion 
of sovereignty implies lack of control or undemocratic delegations of 
power to faceless international bureaucrats. For those in Europe who, 
at least prior to September 11th, bemoaned U.S. unilateralist defiance 
of such worthy international projects as the ban on landmines, the 
Kyoto Protocol, arms control treaties, and the International Criminal 
Court, globalization means recognizing the virtues of multilateralism 
and the limits of hegemonic power. Others would defend only some 
forms of multilateralism. There are some within the United States 
who regard NAFTA or the World Trade Organization (WTO) as "de-
mocracy enhancing" regimes that serve to curb the protectionist ex-
cesses of national government but have only disdain for other multi-
lateral regimes-such as those dealing with human rights or 
3 For a survey of the interplay between public international law and WIO dispute set-
tlement decisions to date, see Joost Pauwelyn, The Rnle of Public International Law in the 
WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM.J. INT'LL. 535 (2001). 
4 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., at 1, 18, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/rev (1984). 
5 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Regina v. Bartle, 2 W.L.R. 827, 38 
I.L.M. 581 (H. L. 1999) (U.K.); see also Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in 
Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 501 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of 
Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RicH. L. REv. 99 (1995). 
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environmental protection-which they regard as hostile to represen-
tative government.6 
At the heart of debates over whether sovereignty is indeed being 
ceded-whether the state is disaggregating,7 eroding, or simply be-
coming more porous-are intergovernmental organizations. These 
international organizations (lOs) have helped to alter the structures 
for treaty making. In this Article, I will focus on the changes in treaty 
making wrought since 1945 and why they matter to sovereignty. 
I. THE PROLIFERATION OF TREATIES 
There is little doubt that recent decades have witnessed a striking 
proliferation in treaties, including multilateral agreements of ambi-
tious substantive scope that aspire to universal participation. Since the 
establishment of the U.N., treaties have attempted to codifY both tra-
ditional topics of international law (e.g., the law of the sea, diplomatic 
and consular relations, the law of treaties, the laws of war, or interna-
tional humanitarian law) as well as newer subjects not previously re-
garded as amenable to or suitable for international regulation (such 
as trade, intellectual property, investment, and international criminal 
law). From 1970 through 1997, the number of international treaties 
more than tripled.8 Even that ostensible unilateralist, the United 
States, has not been immune from being drawn into this dense treaty 
network. In the 1990s the United States concluded 3106 treaties, after 
3690 in the 1980s, 3212 in the 1970s, and 2438 in the 1960s.9 We often 
suggest that the primary explanation for international legalization is 
6 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Slwuld We Take Global Governance Seriously, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
205 (2000);John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilaterialism, 1 Cm.J. INT'L 
L. 381 (2000); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 
1 Cm.J. INT'LL. 291 (2000). 
7 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, 
at 183. 
8 Stewart Patrick, Multilateralism and its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S. 
Ambivalence, in MuLTILATERALISM AND U.S. FoREIGN PoLICY 10 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard 
Forman eds., 2002). 
9 UNITED STATES SENATE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE 
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE-A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE CoMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, S. Doc. No. 106-71, 106th Cong., 2d. Sess 39 (2001). A study of the treaty 
practices of the United States in the most recent period, after its rise to the status of sole 
superpower, finds traditional U.S. ambivalence towards adherence to treaties only "slightly 
more marked" than in prior periods. See Nico Krisch, Weak as a Constraint, Strong as a Tool: 
The Place of International Law in U.S. Foreign Policy, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. 
UNILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM (David Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2002) 
(forthcoming 2002). 
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functionalism. In other words, states are driven to regulate at the in-
ternational level by ever-rising movements of people, goods, and capi-
tal across borders, along with positive and negative externalities 
emerging from such flows-from the rise in a common human rights 
ideal to emerging threats to the global commons. But we should not 
lose sight of the fact that the proliferation of treaties is aided and 
abetted by the concomitant rise in intergovernmental organizations.10 
The age of global compacts is not incidentally also the age of lOs. 
As of 1995, of some 1,500 multilateral treaties in existence, nearly 
half were attributable to U.N. system organizations, and the rate of 
production of new treaties undertaken within the auspices of interna-
tional organizations appears to be steadily increasing.ll A substantial 
number of the approximately 3500 meetings undertaken annually 
within the U.N. involve some kind of treaty-making activity and that 
organization alone has been involved in the conclusion of some 300 
IO At present, there are more than 250 conventional international governmental or-
ganizations, roughly another 5200 intergovernmental bodies of various kinds, and over 
1500 non-governmental organizations registered with the U.N. See Charlotte Ku, Global 
Governance and the Changing Face of International Law, 2 AUNS REP. AND PAPERS 5, 24 
(2001). While these numbers are impressive, it is important to recognize that international 
institutions have life cycles and occasionally die. The growth in these institutions "occa-
sionally plateau[s] following periodic organizing bursts." Id. at 22 (quoting Shanks, Jacob-
son, and Kaplan). 
11 Paul Szasz, General Law-Making Processes, in 35 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 59 
(Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995). While, according to one study, 
there were only eighty-six multilateral treaties concluded in the 100 years between 1751-
1850, there were more than 2000 concluded for the twenty-five year period between 1951-
1975. Ku, supra note 10, at 5. This is not to suggest, however, either that the number of 
multilateral treaties has been raising in predictable or steady fashion over recent years or 
that ever greater numbers of traditional intergovernmental organizations on the model of 
the U.N. are being established by such treaties. Neither is true. That study reveals a drop-
off in the number of new multilateral treaties being concluded in the 1976-1995 period 
compared to the period of 1951-1976, along with a decrease in the number of treaties that 
create conventional intergovernmental organizations in the model of the U.N. Id. at 5-23. 
That study also indicates that multilateral treaties intended for general participation by all 
states still constitute a minority of all treaties concluded annually and that the bulk of 
treaty making remains on a bilateral basis. Id. at 5. But note that the absence of growth in 
traditional intergovernmental organizations does not signifY a withdrawal of commitment 
from other forms of institutionalization considered here, including the rise in unconven-
tional forms of institutions. For a survey of these in one specialized field, see for example, 
Paul C. Szasz, The Proliferation of Arms Control Organizations, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 135 (N.M. Blokker & H.G. Schermers eds., 2001); see also Philippe 
Sands & Pierre Klein, BowETT's LAw OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 121-28 (5th ed. 
2001) (discussing environmental accords). 
218 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:213 
multilateral agreements.12 The U.N. and other comparable institu-
tions have helped to create a "gigantic treaty network ... regulating 
all major international activities. "13 Some international organiza-
tions-such as the U.N. itself, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), and the WTO-were intended to be what they have become: 
virtual treaty machines. Whole areas of modern international law, in-
cluding human rights, would be unimaginable absent treaties con-
cluded under 10 auspices.l4 
II. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
How have lOs changed the realities of treaty making to help 
bring about multilateral regimes that are both decried and praised for 
eroding sovereignty? 
In the 19th century, the fundamental mechanism for multilateral 
treaty making was the ad hoc conference. Before the advent of lOs, 
multilateral treaty making required the initiative of a state sufficiently 
aroused about an issue that it was willing to devote scarce diplomatic 
resources to motivate others and to convene such a conference on its 
territory. Usually, the initiator state determined which states to invite 
and the negotiating agenda. Once convened, the success or failure of 
such conferences turned on the acumen and leverage exercised by 
the government representatives present. In accordance with the prin-
ciple of sovereign equality, decisions were usually taken on the basis of 
unanimity. The governments present determined whether there 
would be subsequent efforts to complete the treaty or, if the treaty was 
concluded, whether there would be any procedures for follow-up. In 
the usual case, enforcement was left to reciprocal action by the indi-
vidual state parties. Except in unusual circumstances, each multilat-
eral treaty negotiation was a freestanding and entirely ad hoc under-
taking, with no necessary connection to any other treaty arrangement. 
The shortcomings of such conferences are, in retrospect, obvi-
ous.l5 Since they were dependent on the willingness of a particular 
12 Roy Lee, Multilateral Treaty-Making and Negotiation Techniques: An Appraisal, in CoN-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEORG SCHWARTZ-
ENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 157 (Bin Chang & Edward Brown eds., 1998). 
u Id. at 158. 
14 Seeid. at 177-216. 
15 See, e.g., Sands & Klein, supra note 11, at 1-4. This is not to deny the impact, over the 
long term, of conferences such as the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 which, in the 
views of some, helped to usher in the modern period devoted to building international 
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state host, treaty making was haphazard and proposals for negotia-
tions on such compacts usually came long after the need for interna-
tional regulation had become acute. Even when treaty conferences 
were convened, there were no guarantees that all states needed to re-
solve the underlying problem or that would be affected by any pro-
posed solution would be present. Complications could ensue due to 
the failure either to include all relevant state parties or all interests 
not adequately represented by state delegations. Those invited and 
present at those conferences could not be sure that the full dimen-
sions of an issue, much less related questions that might be of interest 
only to some states, would be aired-especially if such issues were 
deemed outside the scope of the host state's agenda or would raise 
prickly issues for the gracious host. Since preparations for such con-
ferences were typically left to each state that managed to send a dele-
gation, there was no assurance that negotiations would be based on all 
available technical or factual data or that all states would have equal 
access to any such information or to applicable legal precedents. Indi-
viduals at such negotiations may have met for the first time at the ne-
gotiating site and, given the absence of instantaneous communica-
tions, were relatively cut-off from their national capitals during the 
negotiation period. All of these factors led to rigidities in states' nego-
tiating positions. All of them dampened the likelihood of success.l6 
In game theoretic terms, the ad hoc conferences of the 19th cen-
tury resembled single play prisoners' dilemmas, lacking the benefits 
that we might achieve with repeated play or long term association, 
including reductions in transactions costs and uncertainty, and mu-
tual reliance on long term reputation over short term calculations of 
interest. There were few sunk costs involved in such forms of treaty 
making. No international civil servants existed to serve as repositories 
of knowledge, to transmit information or to propose compromise 
formulations; without international institutions, there were fewer 
mechanisms to enable states to pool their resources. There were few 
established rules of bureaucratic procedure that could be relied upon 
at the international level to encourage what economists and others 
have called "path dependencies. "17 
institutions, culminating in the establishment of the League of Nations. See, e.g., Ku, supra 
note 10, at 14-15. 
16 See, e.g., Sands & Klein, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
17 For a survey and critique of path dependency theory, see SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen 
E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 205 (1995). For 
consideration of the relevance of path dependency to the evolution of the common law, 
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Further, multilateral treaties were, in the 19th century at least, 
not very multilateral. If a treaty was, despite evident deficiencies, con-
cluded, the state designated as the state of registry was in a position to 
deny attempts to ratify by governments that it did not wish to associate 
with, thereby discouraging actual universal participation. Nor was this 
an entirely academic concern: this was a time, after all, when many 
states of the world were considered to be beneath the notice of "civi-
lized states." Worse still, in the absence of on-going mechanisms for 
follow-up, treaty regimes failed to deepen and could even become ob-
solete due to changing needs or technology. 
The establishment of organizations aspiring to universal or nearly 
universal membership corrected many of these shortcomings and 
have made the ad hoc treaty conference unconnected to an estab-
lished 10 a less preferred venue for treaty making. Most multilateral 
treaty regimes of any depth today are the product of one or more of 
the following four organizational patterns for treaty making: (1) 10 
(especially U.N. sponsored) treaty making conferences; (2) expert 
treaty making bodies; (3) "managerial" forms of treaty-making; or (4) 
what some have called institutional mechanisms for "treaty making 
with strings attached." Each will be briefly described below. 
U.N. treaty making conferences-such as the massive 1998 nego-
tiations at Rome to establish an International Criminal Court (ICC), 
involving approximately 160 states, 33 intergovernmental organiza-
tions, over 200 NGOs, and over 400 journalists on site-usually occur 
after a canvassing of views, occasionally exhaustive, and often convene 
with a draft text in hand. Modern treaty making conferences operate 
on the basis of flexible determinations of consensus rather than rigid 
unanimity rules. They follow established organizational patterns, such 
as division between a plenary and more specialized bodies and formal 
versus informal sessions. They rely as well on reasonably clear rules of 
procedure that avoid the need to reinvent the wheel on such topics as 
the credentials of delegates or rules for submitting proposals or quo-
rums.18 Often they rely upon familiar groupings of states seen else-
where in the U.N.-associations that encourage issue linkage and 
package deals. They use 10 secretariats to conduct advance prepara-
tions (such as circulating detailed questionnaires among participants) 
to formulate manageable work plans, and to encourage reliance on 
see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattfffn of Legal Change in 
a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REv. 601, 622-30 ( 2001). 
!8 ROBBIE SABEL, A STUDY OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF CONFERENCES AND AsSEM-
BLIES OF INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 0RGANIZA TIONS ( 1997) . 
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final standard clauses as with respect to reservations and entry into 
force. IO staff also serve as legitimating conduits for proposals made 
by unpopular or isolated states. Members of the international civil 
service even on occasion assist in drafting compromise language. 
The second organizational pattern relies on experts-as with re-
spect to public international law (such as the International Law 
Commission (ILC)), international economic law (such as the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)), or 
more specialized topics (such as the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization's (ICAO) legal committee). Expert treaty making bodies 
generally adhere to carefully delineated, predictable procedures that 
produce large volumes of information, as with respect to the current 
practices and opinions of states. Usually working in tandem with U.N. 
conferences, these institutionalized experts produce drafts that, at 
their best, achieve technocratic legitimacy because of their source and 
quality. For example, ILC commentaries and draft provisions for pro-
posed treaties that have yet to be concluded have sometimes been re-
lied upon by states and others as reliable accounts of existing custom. 
Managerial forms of treaty-making, in areas such as trade, the 
environment, and human rights, attempt to secure the benefits of in-
stitutionalization on an on-going basis and not only when treaties are 
initially concluded. They establish entities that are authorized to 
elaborate standards, as well as monitoring bodies charged with en-
forcement and interpretation, including, in the cases of regional hu-
man rights and trade, binding forms of dispute settlement. Thus, en-
vironmental framework conventions establish committees of the 
parties and other working groups for on-going norm elaboration, in-
terpretation, and "soft" enforcement, such as consideration of states' 
reports of implementation. These framework conventions establish 
"living" treaty regimes without recourse, in the usual case, to formal 
international organizations with distinct legal personality or substan-
tial secretariats. Whether or not they resort to harder forms of en-
forcement such as binding dispute settlement, several of these mana-
gerial regimes have deepened over time and all offer "the prospect of 
a virtually continuous legislative enterprise"19 capable of responding 
to changes in technology or to the needs of the parties. The success of 
these modern treaty regimes can no longer be judged the way we 
19 Gunter Hand!, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge of International 
Law in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (W. Lang eta!. eds., 
1991). 
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judged the 19th century compact- through a snapshot frozen at a sin-
gle moment in time. The success of these living treaties is now best 
measured through a modern motion picture, which is able to record 
their evolutionary development across time. The twelve protocols of 
the European system of Human Rights, the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Uruguay Round 
are all products of managerial regimes and are characteristic of how 
they function. 
Finally, there is treaty making that is constitutionally sanctioned, 
even mandated, under the charter of a formal full-fledged 10 that 
tries to pressure its members to ratifY the treaties produced by the re-
gime. The clearest manifestation of such "treaty making with strings 
attached" is the ILO. The ILO's Constitution incorporates a highly 
structured, relatively rigid set of procedures that produce, at predict-
able intervals, treaty instruments-at last count over 170 of them. The 
ILO's Constitution ties "strings" to its instruments, requiring ILO 
members to bring the conventions to the attention of their legisla-
tures and requiring periodic follow-up reports on implementation. A 
variety of ILO expert bodies thereafter engage in monitoring and dis-
pute settlement, though not clearly with binding effect. The ILO at-
tempts, with mixed success, something of an end-run around sover-
eign consent. The reporting and other obligations imposed under the 
ILO's Charter mobilize shame on behalf of treaty ratification. 
Of course, these four organizational patterns for treaty making 
are not invariably successful. Some organizational venues have dele-
gitimized treaty negotiation efforts. During the bad old days of the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), for example, endorse-
ment of an economic treaty by the General Assembly was the kiss of 
death-at least among western business constituencies. 10 bureaucra-
cies, like bureaucracies elsewhere, may also prove inefficient or inef-
fective at encouraging agreement; they may develop their own agen-
das at the expense of the state principals they ostensibly serve. 
Ritualized institutional precedents may sometimes limit negotiators' 
field of vision; path dependencies, such as an infatuation with deci-
sions by "consensus" however cosmetic, may lock negotiations onto 
the wrong historical path or result in meaningless lowest common 
denominator solutions. Modern international law is strewn with the 
wreckage of package deals that fail to secure the rates of ratification 
expected within a reasonable time-even when these result from the 
efforts of experts as in the ILO. And there is no guarantee that even 
when lOs promulgate widely ratified treaties, what lOs produce are 
any better at taking care of the underlying problems sought to be 
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solved. As with respect to domestic law, more law or more treaties is 
not necessarily a good thing. Quantity should not be confused with 
quality. 
But, these four organizational patterns have changed the land-
scape of treaty making in at least five respects that are essential to un-
derstanding both the nature of globalization as well as perceived ero-
sions of sovereignty. 
First, lOs have dramatically expanded the diversity of actors in-
volved in treaty making. The winners have been less powerful gov-
ernments, NGOs and other interest groups, the international civil 
service and experts, including public international law scholars. Due 
to the use of lOs as venues, it is now far more likely that even small or 
less powerful states will be able to make an impact on the types of is-
sues that are subject to treaty negotiations, as well as with respect to 
the substance of what is ultimately concluded. Thanks to such venues, 
less powerful governments are more likely to be able to secure the 
benefits of a treaty obligation with powerful states. Without lOs, pow-
erful states would be freer to engage bilaterally or multilaterally only 
with those states with whom they have an interest in contracting. lOs, 
even if only by making the neutral U.N. and not a host state the de-
pository of treaty ratifications, have made modern multilateral treaties 
more truly multilateral, thereby democratizing treaty making. 
Structural aspects of lOs, including provisions for access to 
documents and for observer or other forms of non-voting status, have, 
in addition, provided entry points for NGOs' growing participation in 
various forms of interstate diplomacy, including treaty making. They 
permit domestic interest groups, along with relevant domestic gov-
ernment agencies, to direct their lobbying efforts on those lOs that 
are the most promising venues for their concerns. Thus, business 
groups in the United States whose competitive interests were threat-
ened by the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act sought to 
multilateralize the regulation of bribery-and thereby level the play-
ing field-in the forum most likely to reach their main European and 
Japanese competitors, namely the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ( 0 ECD). Similarly, a transnational alli-
ance of business leaders anxious to secure enforceable intellectual 
property rights, dissatisfied with World Intellectual Property Organi-
224 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:213 
zation's (WIPO) efforts, were able to frame this issue as a proper mat-
ter for the WT0.20 
In addition, the conception of an international civil service as a 
breed apart, distinct from the governments from which these indi-
viduals emerge, has legitimized the participation of 10 secretariats in 
treaty making. The power of such individuals to become active in 
treaty making, only sometimes explicitly conferred-as in a resolution 
inviting secretariat participation in the compiling of state views or in 
drafting an initial negotiating text-has been generally assumed to be 
part of a secretariat's "implied powers." 
Expert treaty-drafting bodies have opened the door to yet an-
other type of non-state actor: the individual legitimized by their ex-
pertise and claim to independence. In other organizations, such as 
the ILO, the participation of distinct constituencies-namely employ-
ers and labor unions-is built into the constitutional structure of 
treaty making. In these respects as well the involvement of lOs in 
treaty making has "democratized" the process. The wider diversity of 
state and non-state actors helps to explain the wider diversity of trea-
ties concluded in the age of lOs, as well as the variety of pressures that 
are brought to bear on those governmental representatives who are 
still, in most respects, at least formally in charge of the initiation of 
treaty making, as well as formal ratification. 
Second, lOs have either multiplied the options for treaty initia-
tors or complicated their lives depending on one's point of view. To-
day, the initiation of a multilateral treaty negotiation requires, as a key 
and crucial decision, the matter of organizational venue. Those intent 
on negotiating modern international compacts need to decide not 
just between whether to convene a special ad hoc conference or to 
resort to a standing international organization. They also need to de-
cide which international organization and which organs within them 
ought to be involved. In recent years, the international community 
has confronted a number of such choices. Treaty efforts on bribery 
have involved regional lOs such as the OECD, the European Union, 
the OAS, and the Council of Europe, as well as international financial 
organizations and the U.N. General Assembly.21 Nuclear proliferation 
20 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and 
Corruption, 4]. lNT'L EcoN. L. 275, 282-83 (2001). Abbott goes on to explain that business 
interests did not pursue their interests in transnational regulation on bribery within the 
WfO because leveling the playing field against the smaller non-OECD competitors ''was 
not a sufficiently high priority." Id. at 282. 
21 Id. 
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issues have involved choices as between the IAEA or the U.N. General 
Assembly, while foreign investment, initially considered in the OECD 
and in regional treaties, may yet be folded into the wro. 
Determining which organization and which sub-organ ought to 
be the venue in which to initiate a treaty process may determine 
whether the process will involve time-consuming and exhaustive 
analysis of the current state of the law by general legal experts,22 more 
superficial examination of the need for a treaty by those attentive to 
the political desires of states,23 or thorough examination of the need 
for a treaty relegated to technical experts in relatively narrow special-
ties.24 Alternatively, treaty initiators may opt for processes that contain 
elements of all of these, such as the ILO. Organizational venues may 
also determine whether negotiators will be able to take advantage of a 
credible dispute settlement process25 or other supervisory procedures, 
be able to engage in a gradualist strategy that relies initially on soft 
law and soft enforcement, or be able to secure efficacious regional 
credibility.26 The choice of organizational venue may determine 
whether treaty negotiations will be more or less transparent since dis-
tinct lOs have different traditions in this respect. Given this range of 
choices, the ability to choose among organizational venues implicitly 
forces treaty initiators to consider matters relating to the substance of 
the proposed treaty even before formal negotiations begin. 
The choice of organizational venue speaks volumes concerning 
the intent of principal treaty backers. Those who attempt to insert a 
new issue in a wro trade round, for example, would appear to be 
suggesting that the issue has an implicit link to trade, since that is the 
WfO's domain, and that it is an issue that can be appropriately made 
the subject of WfO dispute settlement as well as WfO-sanctioned 
trade retaliation if necessary, since these remedies have, at least since 
the Uruguay Round, been assumed to be applicable to all or most 
matters within the wro. Anticipation that both the linkage to trade 
and enforcement issues will need to be addressed casts a shadow-a 
positive and a negative-over the prospect of initiating negotiations 
22 Such as the ILC. 
23 E.g., in the assemblies of various lOs representing the full membership. 
24 Such as in ICAO's Legal Committee. 
25 As in the wro. 
26 See, e.g., id. at 289-90 (noting how the U.S.'s strategy with respect to the regulation 
of bribery was highly congenial to the OECD given that organization's tendency to act 
through a variety of both hard and soft instruments, as well as reliance on peer review and 
public pressure rather than litigation). 
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within the WT0.27 While it might be assumed that the prospect of 
binding dispute settlement would tend to discourage adding new is-
sues to the trade regime, it would appear that in at least some cases, 
such organizational realities may enhance the attractiveness of the 
WTO. Certainly the pressure to link some issues to the trade regime, 
such as labor rights or environmental concerns, stems in part from 
penance-envy:28 the perception, accurate or not, that WTO dispute 
settlement constitutes the most effective enforcement tool available at 
the global level and that such a potentially effective tool ought to be 
made applicable to these other concerns. At the same time, lOs de-
velop distinct institutional cultures that may hinder attempts to use 
them as negotiating venues in some cases. The WTO's tradition of 
including issues in trade rounds only if these can be the basis of recip-
rocal concessions, for example, may make it difficult to build into that 
regime treaty commitments less amenable to such trades.29 
Third, because lOs increase the number of actors involved as well 
as the options available to treaty makers, they have a third impact: 
they alter the role of state power. The involvement of lOs may de-
crease the salience of traditional state power. Unlike in the 19th cen-
tury, a serious multilateral treaty negotiation today does not require a 
hegemonic prime mover. Suggestions for such negotiations may be 
and are made even by the least powerful state representatives to an 
international organization, as in the U.N. General Assembly or com-
parable plenary bodies where the formal rules for voting (one 
state/one vote), can secure majority support for proposed treaty mak-
ing over the opposition of a minority of powerful states. The 1990 ac-
tion by the General Assembly that ultimately led to the successful con-
clusion of the Rome Statute for the ICC on July 17, 1998 stemmed 
from a 1989 initiative by Trinidad and Tobago, for example. Thanks 
to lOs, smaller or less powerful states are also more likely to find allies 
in a common cause, thereby permitting some leverage to be asserted 
even as against powerful states. 
The access rights given to NGOs also increase the proportionate 
power of these purported representatives of international civil society 
27 Id. 
28 I owe this colorful turn of phrase to Joel Trachtman. 
29 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 20, at 286, 291. Abbott contends that the WTO's culture 
of focusing on market access to the exclusion of more normative dimensions as well as 
emphasis on hard law rather than softer obligations, made it an unlikely forum for focus-
ing on the normative aspects of the bribery and corruption issue in the ways that the 
OECD was able to do. !d. at 286-291. 
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over treaty making decisions. Intense and successful NGO lobbying 
efforts on behalf of some treaties-as with respect to land-mines or to 
establish an individual complaints mechanism for the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)-are the 
predictable result. 30 The increasing attention given to the power of 
NGOs misses part of the picture if it fails to acknowledge that inter-
governmental organizations are often the conduit for the growing 
clout ofNGOs.31 
The very existence of lOs conditions the traditional use of state 
power. In theory, governments retain the option of starting treaty ne-
gotiations the old-fashioned way, namely through a diplomatic ap-
proach to select states and invitations to a special ad hoc conference 
to conclude a stand-alone treaty. In practice, while such ad hoc con-
ferences continue to be used for some treaty negotiations, many 
modern multilateral treaty negotiations have been authorized by an 
10, such as the U.N. General Assembly, and many of these treaties es-
tablish bodies that function much like lOs even after a text is con-
cluded, as in environmental regimes. The reasons are straightforward: 
most treaty initiators want to secure the advantages of an organiza-
tional setting, and even when key players do not, there may be con-
siderable political pressure brought to bear to secure the endorse-
ment of the organizational body whose established competence 
appears most directly relevant. Today, even a powerful state would 
find it difficult to attempt a major multilateral treaty making effort 
regarding international civil aviation, for example, without at least 
attempting to involve ICAO or presenting credible reasons why that 
institution's involvement would be inappropriate. In addition, should 
the relevant organs of ICAO, including the expert bodies normally 
involved in such efforts, reject such a proposal, the prospects for a 
successful negotiation involving a credible number of participants are 
!10 For a discussion of the early evolution of an Optional Protocol to CEDAW, and the 
impact ofU.N.-sponsored human rights conferences at Vienna (1993) and Beijing (1995), 
see Lilly Scharipa-Behrmann, An optional Protocol to CEDAW: A Further Step Towards Strength-
ening of Women~ Human Rights, in LIBER AMICORUM: PROFESSOR IGNAZ SEIDL HONHEN-
VELDERN IN HoNOUR OF HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY 683 (Gerhard Hafner et al. eds., 1998). For a 
critical view of the significant role played by NGOs with respect to the landmines conven-
tion, see Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of Interna-
tional Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EuR. J. INT'L 
L. 91 (2000). 
SI Indeed, some believe that international society has entered a new post-
institutionalist period dominated by international civil society. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 10, 
at 26-34 (noting the far larger rise in the numbers of NGOs relative to the more modest 
increase in the numbers of traditional intergovernmental organizations). 
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considerably diminished. Where an 10 exists with jurisdiction over a 
matter that is proposed for treaty making, its mere existence affects 
the decision of whether, when, and where to initiate such a negotia-
tion. 
At the same time, lOs remain vehicles for the assertion of state 
power. The choice among organizational venues is often influenced, 
not to say determined, by the continuing realities of relative power. It 
was important in the now comparatively innocent 1960s and 1970s, 
when airline hijackings first dominated the headlines, for example, 
for the primary movers of anti-terrorism conventions, like the United 
States, to have these negotiations initiated in the relatively efficient 
confines of ICAO rather than in the U.N. General Assembly. Western 
preferences have also prevailed with respect to other choices of 
venue-as respect to the trade regime (over WIPO) for intellectual 
property; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (over the 
General Assembly) for certain proliferation conventions; and the 
OECD (over the WTO) for the aborted Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAl). Power still matters to modern treaty making but it 
is often exercised to a distinct end: to favor one organizational forum 
for negotiations over another. 32 
Even when powerful states prevail in their choice of organiza-
tional venue, that choice may constrain them. Particular organiza-
tional venues often constrain even the powerful. The United States 
paid a price for the various anti-terrorism conventions that it success-
fully and speedily concluded under ICAO auspices some thirty years 
ago. While the United States would have preferred a comprehensive 
treaty regime leading to the suppression of the most serious acts of 
terrorist violence regardless of setting, the ICAO setting for such ne-
gotiations, while far preferable to the U.S. standpoint than the U.N. 
General Assembly, compelled a narrower and more piecemeal ap-
proach. It virtually ensured criminalization only for acts directly relat-
ing to civil aviation, namely violence on board aircraft, the targeting 
of aircraft for destruction, aircraft hijacking, and offenses at interna-
32 Nor, of course, does power cease to be relevant once negotiations begin or a treaty is 
concluded. As ICAO's anti-terrorism conventions remind us, use of an organizational 
venue for purposes of negotiation does not ensure that organizational mechanisms will be 
used for enforcement. Those conventions avoid the use of established ICAO fora, includ-
ing the methods of dispute settlement within ICAO's constitution (resort to the ICAO 
Council and to the ICJ). Instead, the extradition and prosecution regime effectively puts 
the onus of enforcement back on state parties, thereby giving powerful states, capable of 
exerting leverage on others, considerable free rein. 
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tional airports.33 In addition, while the United States initially wanted a 
regime that would permit joint enforcement action such as an inter-
national civil aviation boycott against a state that failed to honor its 
obligations to extradite terrorists, it quickly abandoned this goal when 
negotiators realized that such a hard sanction was a non-starter in an 
organization with an ethos that identifies the right to engage in civil 
aviation as a fundamental sovereign right.34 Today, in the wake of Sep-
tember 11th, the United States appears to be scrambling back to an 
organization that it sought to avoid in the 1970s, namely the U.N., 
since that organization now offers the better prospect for achieving 
broader anti-terrorism goals, including treaties that fill gaps remain-
ing in the wake of ICAO's efforts. 
In addition, since states rightly assume that the choice of organ-
izational forum matters, they expend considerable resources to make 
sure the right one is chosen. Strenuous and diplomatically costly ef-
forts were necessary to make sure that, for example, foreign invest-
ment negotiations were initiated in the OECD, and not the wro. In 
that instance, while the United States and many of the other leading 
exporters of capital would have preferred a regime for foreign in-
vestment with global reach, the decision to negotiate the MAl within 
an organization with a more limited membership was a calculated, 
ultimately unsuccessful, gamble to forego geographical reach in favor 
of presumptive depth of obligation. 
Fourth, international organizations have vastly increased the 
amount of information available to treaty initiators. The information 
supplied by organizational venues may encourage the initiation of 
treaty making directly, as through proposals made by lOs, or indi-
rectly, by inspiring certain governments to act. Many have contended 
that the negotiations leading to the 1987 Montreal Protocol would 
never have been initiated, for example, but for the level of scientific 
data concerning ozone depletion generated by the various entities 
established by the preceding Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
33 See Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Hague Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,860 U.N.T.S. 105; 
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Vio-
lence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, ICAO Doc. 9518, 27 
I.L.M. 627. 
M See GEOFFREY M. LEVITT, DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERROR 10-11 (1988) (discussing 
history of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft). 
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the Ozone Layer. 35 The supply of information may alter not only the 
decision of whether to initiate treaty making, but how and where to 
do so. Today, decisions to pursue particular topics in a distinct organ-
izational setting are likely to be taken with full awareness of the prior 
history of that forum with respect to the topic in question and may 
reflect an intention to affect the substantive result on many matters-
and not merely enforcement method, as in the wro example above. 
A decision to attempt to initiate today the subject of foreign invest-
ment in the next wro trade round, for example, would appear tan-
tamount to a decision to give up on certain investment protections. 
This would certainly be the implication a prospective treaty initiator 
would take from the WfO's extensive reports on its diverse member-
ship's views on the subject, as well as that organization's prior efforts, 
as in connection with Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) or 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) .36 Those who, 
desiring a successful conclusion to such a negotiation, propose adding 
investment issues to the next WfO Round would presumably be do-
ing so because they want investment guarantees to extend to the 
WfO's global membership, because even the "lesser" investor rights, 
and possible duties, would presumably be subject to binding wro 
dispute settlement open only to GATT parties (and not directly to in-
vestors themselves as under bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
the NAFfA's Chapter 11) because the failure of the OECD's prior ef-
forts leaves no other credible organizational option, or because of 
some other presumed benefit, such as possible trade offs with respect 
to other issues anticipated within the same trade round. As this sug-
gests, organizational venues and the information they produce con-
siderably enhance the likelihood of "nesting" issues in a broader con-
35 See, e.g., Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Plumomenon in International Law, 94 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 623 (2000). For a more critical view of managerial regimes, see George W. 
Downs et al., The Transformative Model of International Regime Design: Triump of Hope or Experi-
ence?, 38 COLUM.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 465 (2000). 
36 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1974, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY RouND, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs]; see also INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw HANDBOOK 
387, 531 (Raj Bhala ed., 2001). These Agreements are also available on the WTO web site, 
at http:/ /www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). 
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text so that the "fabric of one provides the foundation of another"37 as 
well as with respect to making links between issues that facilitate pack-
age deals. It is also important to recognize that information produced 
by one organizational venue in the course of one treaty negotiation, 
such as the lengthy negotiations to conclude the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, have had important spillover effects on other ne-
gotiations, as with respect to later dealings with respect to environ-
mental accords; such effects are increasingly anticipated, thereby 
influencing interstate reactions in both the earlier and later sets of 
negotiations. 
A decision to pursue negotiations in a particular organization 
might also be tantamount to a decision not to conclude a full-scale 
multilateral treaty on the subject but some other kind of instrument. 
Thus, decisions to initiate discussions in, for example, UNCITRAL, 
are taken with the full knowledge that, given the practices of that 
body, this may be tantamount to deciding in favor of either a "model 
law" that can inspire the harmonization of domestic laws or non-
binding "guidelines" instead of a binding treaty.38 Certain organiza-
tional settings are suited to regulatory or recommendatory action and 
not the initiation of binding treaty instruments-and prove them-
selves attractive negotiating sites precisely for that reason. Indeed, we 
are becoming increasingly aware that lOs are dramatically changing 
the other primary source of international obligation-custom-as 
well as treaties. The new treaty makers are also generating new custom 
that differs markedly from the slow, laborious accumulation of bilat-
eral practices and expressions of opinio juris that characterized tradi-
tional customary internationallaw.39 
As this suggests, international organizations may occasionally 
have an adverse impact on the possibility that particular multilateral 
negotiations will be initiated. Judging from the large number of multi-
lateral efforts sponsored annually under their auspices, however, it 
would appear that the existence of permanent organizational venues 
for such negotiations has generally made states more amenable to 
5' For a description of nesting, see Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Poli-
tics, 38 WoRLD PoL. 25,45 (1985). 
58 For a recent report of UNCITRAL's efforts, see Report of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law on the Work of its Thirty-Second &ssion, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/54/17 (1999). 
59 New custom may emerge from consciously created norms applicable even with re-
spect to non-parties to a widely ratified convention; it may also result from information 
generated in plenary organizational fora such as the U.N. General Assembly. &ejonathan 
I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 529,536-42 (1993). 
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multilateral treaty making-or at least made it more likely that a 
shrewd initiator will be able to find a forum that favors treaty negotia-
tions. 
This implies a fifth and final change from 19th century treaty 
making efforts: particularly to the extent anticipated treaty negotia-
tions are to take place within established organizational fora and not 
through the convening of a special ad hoc conference, support for 
initiating treaty negotiations may emerge much more easily and 
quickly than in an earlier age when states were required to mobilize 
and devote substantial diplomatic and other resources for such ef-
forts. Treaty negotiations are, in short, more likely when they can take 
advantage of organizational venues whose "sunk costs" have already 
been absorbed by their members. Voting in favor (or more commonly 
merely refusing to disturb consensus) in favor of a resolution that di-
rects that international civil servants ought to study "topic x" with re-
spect to the "propriety of concluding an international convention" on 
said topic is often seen as an anodyne or a relatively cost free decision. 
Even when a state's delegate to the IO in question realizes that such a 
decision is not really cost free and that it may begin a process whose 
momentum may prove difficult to stop, it is usually less painful politi-
cally to join consensus in favor of initiating treaty negotiations than to 
resist. In addition, to the extent organizational venues with a diverse 
membership tend to expand the potential negotiating agenda and 
increase the potential for nesting and package deals, these realities 
increase the numbers of states willing to engage in negotiations or for 
whom such negotiations are of interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Increased treaty making amidst proliferating conventional and 
less conventional intergovernmental organizations suggests nascent 
structures of international governance. For some, these regimes serve 
as vehicles for exporting America's regulatory New Deal to the 
world.40 I would suggest, more humbly, that if anything is to be drawn 
from the New Deal era in the United States it might be inspiration 
from the legal discipline that it spawned- administrative law. Felix 
Frankfurter's influential casebook of 1932 on that subject as well as 
Walter Gellhorn's of 1940 set forth three major inquiries for the then 
40 See, e.g., Anne Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, 
and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THE-
ORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FoRM l (John G. Ruggie ed., 1993). 
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new scholars of administrative law; they were urged to examine: ( 1) 
the extent of legislative authority to delegate power to administrative 
agencies; (2) the nature of judicial review of agency action; and (3) 
the formal aspects of agency procedure.41 Today, even with the new 
treaty makers in relative infancy, international lawyers appear to be 
groping towards the three types of inquiries suggested by Frankfurter 
and Gellhorn. 
At the global level we are also beginning to inquire about the le-
gitimacy of the delegated authority we are apparently granting to 
some of our international institutions-whether it is the Security 
Council or the Executive Directors of the IMF. Indeed, we are debat-
ing whether there is or ought to be a concept of "improper delega-
tion" in internationallaw.42 We are asking whether the failure to pro-
vide in a treaty a precise rule instead of a vaguer standard ought to be 
seen as invariably a delegation to a relevant dispute settler to legislate 
or to fill in gaps to avoid a finding of non-liquet43 and indeed, 
whether findings of non-liquet are even permissible for our new in-
ternational judiciary. 44 
We are also beginning to consider whether some of our multilat-
eral regimes have been or are being "constitutionalized" such that it is 
relevant to consider whether their stakeholders constitute a 
"demos. "45 This necessarily raises questions of the scope of judicial 
review or the scope of authority of international judicial bodies over 
relevant constituencies. Should the World Court be able to judicially 
review the acts of the Security Council?46 Should a NAFTA Chapter 11 
panel be able to review a state court judgment issued by a state 
41 See, e.g., ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 
(1979). 
42 For a detailed examination of the delegation issue in the context of the U.N., see 
DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECU-
RITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 
(1999). 
4~ Cf Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of wro Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 333, 
346 (1999). 
44 See, e.g., Prosper Weil, The Court Cannot Conclude Definitely ... Non Liquet Revisited, 36 
CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 109, 110 (1997) ("[t]he view prevailing among writers is that 
there is no room for non liquet in international adjudication because there are no lacunae 
in international law"). 
45 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?: Contrilnt-
tions fly the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 25 (1998); G. 
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade 
Organization, 44 DuKE LJ. 829, 907 (1995);Joseph Weiler &Joel P. Trachtman, European 
Constitutionalism and its Discontents, 17 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 354, 372 (1996--1997). 
46 See, e.g.,Jose E. Alvarez, judging the Security Counci~ 90 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (1996). 
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party?47 What are the democratic or other checks on the WfO Appel-
late Body when it engages in judicial review over a state's regulatory 
action?48 Should we worry about a threat to the uniformity of interna-
tional rules as international tribunals proliferate?49 
Finally, as the protestors of Seattle remind us, we are entering 
into an increasingly heated debate over the formal aspects of agency 
action at the international level and most specifically about the demo-
cratic legitimacy of such action. Should NGOs have greater access to 
wro working groups, wro documents, and dispute settlement?50 
Should international civil society be given an opportunity for notice 
and comment on the proposed agenda for new trade rounds or be-
fore the Human Rights Committee issues interpretations of consider-
able general import? Is transparency a principle of international law 
that ought now be imported into all institutions of global governance, 
such that it applies as much to the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council as to states subject to the investment guarantees of Chap-
ter 11 of NAFTA?51 
All of these difficult-but eerily familiar-questions characterize 
the age of "globalization" amidst "eroding sovereignty." We can only 
hope that we will be able to answer them with the same ingenuity that 
non-international lawyers have used to solve their domestic analogues. 
47 For an example of a case brought under Chapter 11 that raises this question, see 
Robert E. Lutz & Russell C. Trice, NAFTA at Five and the Loewen Case: Is NAFTA the Blood 
Relative of Lady justice IJr the Angel of Death f1Jr State Sovereignty, 2 TRANSLEX: TRANSNATIONAL 
LAw EXCHANGE 1 (Oct., 1999). 
48 Cf Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, 
and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 202 (1996) (discussing the 
potential relevance of U.S. Supreme Court's Chevron standard within the WTO context). 
49 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law 
Threatened lly Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 REcuEIL DEs CouRs 101 (1998). 
50 For suggestions along these lines, see Steve Charnovitz, Economic and Social ActiJrs in 
the WIJrld Trade Organization, 7 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 259 (2001). 
51 For opposing views concerning the applicability of transparency within the NAFTA's 
Chapter 11, compare Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001) 
(finding that foreign investors are entitled to the benefits of transparency under Chapter 
11), with United Mexican States v. Metalclad, [2001] B.C.L.R.2d 664 (Can.), available at 
http:/ /www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm (finding that the state parties to 
NAFTA did not commit themselves to transparency under Chapter 11). 
